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The Effect of a Butterfly 
upon an Opus of Architecture 
A Catastrophe Theoretical Perspective upon Design Theory 
by Ole M0ystad 
L ET US START BY CONSIDERING ARCHITECTURE as the form which is generated by the confrontation between the forces of physics and those of thought. 
Then, let us establish the strata by which this form becomes manifest. 
Let us refer to the singular, local piece of architecture, the individual 
physical entity, as the Object of Architecture, Ob A. The general global 
level of architecture, our architectural environment, I will suggest to 
understand as a field. That is to say that I will refer to that area of the 
world where the force dynamics1 between physics and thought unfold 
as the Field of Architecture, FoA. Between these two strata we must 
establish a third level as an access to the previous two lewels; 
representing the level on which we use and produce architecture. Let 
us call this stratum of interaction and comprehension the Opus of 
Architecture, OpA. 
As architecture belongs both to physics, as ObA, and to thought, 
as FoA, to matter and to mind, a knowledge of architecture, as OpA, 
has to comprise and connect the two. ObA will be an entity whose 
extension is basically spatial, and it will roughly correspond to 
'architecture's second mode of being'.2 FoA can, on the other hand, 
not be said to have any other extension than a temporal one. It will 
roughly correspond to 'architecture's first mode of being'. Together 
ObA and FoA will constitute a virtual space-time continuum. By 
providing an access to this continuum, or rather to one particular piece 
of it, we can say that an OpA is an actualisation of a certain amount 
of architectonic space-time. OpA will roughly correspond to 
'architecture's third mode of being'. 
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Towards this backdrop the claim of Perez-Gomez that "Architecture 
is a verb" becomes meaningful.3 As architecture is a space-time 
entity, the knowledge of it must in the least account for the span of 
space-time that OpA actualises. 
A topology of architectonic knowledge can be understood as the 
form, or regularity, according to which architecture unfolds; from 
conception to design, to construction, use4, decay, demolition and 
memory. To the extent that architectonic knowledge is possible, it 
hence relates 'mind' and 'physics', or subject and object if one 
prefers, and itdoes so adopting both 'time' and 'space' as parameters. 
The topic of this paper is therefore located in the interface between 
architect - engineer, client and user. I will be referring to this as 'the 
OpA interface'. 
One is used to give technical and economical performance 
specifications of a project. This is quite normally required, and there 
are well established methods available for making such specifica-
tions. Recently, however, public authorities as well as potential clients 
have started to require architects to submit performance specifications 
also concerning aesthetical and other hardly quantifiable properties of 
a project - before the contract is signed or permission is issued5. 
Architects are hence faced with the problem of giving a reasonably 
precise conceptual outline of OpA, so precise that it can be subjected 
to meaningful evaluation by client, constructor, user and/or public 
authorities - before singularizing the qualities in an actual project. 
Conjunction between architecture's material aspects and its cognitive, 
cultural aspects is in fact made pragmatically every time something 
is built; the only novelty is that the architect is asked to account 
publicly for his act It seems a reasonable request, and it seems 
reasonable to expect of a theory of architectural design that it con-
tributes to this account. 
There are three aspects to the making up of the account First there 
is the problem of producing the conceptual outline of OpA, all quali-
ties included. Then there is the problem of actualization, of producing 
one particular physical object6 which meets the promises given in the 
conceptual outline.These are both complex and important problems to 
study. A precondition for solving them is, however, that there is some 
kind of a connection, or channel, or passage between the two, between 
architecture's being as thought, and its being as object. This paper is 
intended to give a suggestion as to the description of that passage. 
Method 
In the outline of the topic I introduced the concept of a passage 
between architecture's first and second modes of being.7 In terms of 
a phenomenology taking interest in architecture as a problem of 
presence, of being-in-the-world, the first mode of being would 
actually correspond to a not being; the problem of absence so to speak. 
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Only in the case of the second mode of being we would be having to 
do with being. In strict phenomenological terms our topic would in 
other words be architecture's leap from not-being to being. In an other 
terminology this leap is referred to as creation, and not even theology 
seems to have been able to account very accurately for that act. 
I have tried to de-deify the act by presupposing that what goes into 
a house, ObA, is not brought into the world by a divine creator. It may 
initially have been, but then at such space-time distance from our 
scenario that it must be held as irrelevant to a contemporary theory of 
architectural design. For what can be classified as methodological 
reasons, I have presupposed that whatever goes into ObA is already 
virtually there; within FoA. When the thought of an ObA enters the 
space-time of OpA, it is actualized as architecture in its first mode of 
being. When the rain and the brick, or the overhanging cliffs in the 
Vezere Valley, enter OpA, they are actualized as architecture in its 
second mode of being. What I am suggesting with the introduction of 
a third mode of being is that architecture does not lapse into being if 
only a sufficiently inspired architect thinks about a house while 
holding a brick in his hand. Even a genial architect has to put down 
some labour in making a house from brick and thought. Furthermore 
it takes labour for the user to obtain shelter, pleasure, comfort, rest, 
inspiration and whatever else we require even from a beautifully 
arranged heap of bricks in order to accept it as architecture. An ObA 
ex nihilo does not provide any of these things. It is not until a building 
is perceived and experienced in the context of the OpA interface that 
the quality 'architecture' can unfold. Architecture's third mode of 
being hence concerns architecture from conception to use; archi-
tecture's third mode of being is actually architecture's becoming. 
The introduction of this concept presupposes that it takes time to 
bring architecture from not-being to being; that there is a certain 
space-time between 0 and 1. This presupposition implies that the 
space-time in question is not some black spot in the being of 
architecture, but on the contrary that it is an essential property of 
architecture. This may seem banal, but every modern, that is to say 
digital, computation is based upon the opposite principle. Even 
experimental analogue computation in studies of artificial intelli-
gence is conducted on digital computers simulating analogy. 
Architecture does not pertain to the world as given, or let us say to 
nature. It is a design product; like an artificial neural network is a 
design product. If, therefore, architecture in fact does hold the gradual 
unfolding of a space-time between 0 and 1, or between not-being and 
being, as one of its basic properties, this movement should somehow 
be describable as a morphogenetic process. 
Morphogenetic processes, in general, in whatever field form 
occurs and unfolds, is studied by Catastrophe Theory (CT). I have 
therefore paid some interest to CT, in the hope of coming closer to an 
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Figure 1. A cat's change bet-
ween hunter and not-hunter 
illustrated on the uni-para-
metric catastrophe called 
"The Fold". 
"Mouse-vector" 
"Dog-vector" 
The cat is a hunter Catastrophe The cat is not a hunter 
understanding of morphogenesis within architecture. Before we 
proceed to try CT-models on the formation of architecture, I will give 
a (very) brief introduction to the theory. 
The most concise outline of Catastrophe Theory to my knowledge, 
is given by Zeeman: "It is a scientific manner by which we can make 
models of phenomena where a continuos cause produces a disconti-
nuous effect."8 Zeeman gives as example the gradually proceeding 
inclination of a ship causing it at one point to turn abruptly over and 
sink. Given FoA as our context, the continuous cause would be OpA, 
and ObA would be the discontinuous effect. 
" I would say that above all it (Catastrophe Theory) is a methodo-
logy9" Rene Thom holds that the object of any science can be 
inscribed in a spatio-temporal phenomenology. In his early works he 
studied topological theory in mathematics. He started however, to 
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Control 
space 
Graph of 
Behaviour 
Figure 2. Zeeman's analysis 
of a dog's Aggression. The 
upper graph is called "The 
Graph of Comportment", and 
the lower graph is referred to 
asthe "Control space". Point 
A represents the catastrophe 
of escape, the point where 
the dog definitely becomes 
prey. Point B represents the 
catastrophe of attack, where 
the dog definitely becomes 
hunter. 
otice that the topologies he studied as purely abstract forms in 
athematics tended to be repeated in material processes, like for 
stance the morphogenesis of an embryo, the evolution of geologi-
al formations, the breaking of a wave etc. Based on such observations 
hom developed a general topological theory of the morphology of 
e natural world, the world of spatio-temporal phenomena. This 
eory was first published in 1972 entitled Stabilité structurelle et 
-rphogenése.10 
I will try to avoid venturing into the mathematical jargon of CT. 
or our purposes it suffices to understand the underlying logic and the 
hematics of the method. As a matter of fact, once one is able to sur-
ass the somewhat forbidding mathematical jargon of CT, an archi-
ct will soon recognize a way of thinking by means of schematizations 
d graphic representations that combine apparently incompatible 
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Name of 
singularities 
Organisa-
tory 
Center 
Universal 
unfolding 
Observed Sections Spatial Interpre-
tations 
Temporary Interpre-
tations 
Destructive Constructive 
Characteristic 
topology 
Simple minimum V = I J Being Object 
Being, lasting 
The Fold Edge En3 
Start , A 
Beginning \J \# 
The Cusp Crevine 
TI (Biology) 
V = xVux'+vx 
Breaking 
wave 
Changing 
Capture 
Break 
Disrupt 
Engender 
Unite 
Figure 3. The List of the four 
most commonly referred to 
of the Elementary Cata-
strophes according to René 
Thorn. 
parameters. As such, the method has very much in common with the 
way any architect works when he combines construction details and 
functional diagrams with general lay-out plans and associative 
sketches, all in one drawing. 
The term "Catastrophe" refers to the point at which one form or 
condition lapses into another. A classical example of this is a cat's 
change from hunter into prey. In its most elementary version the 
catastrophe represents the change from hunter to not-hunter or from 
prey to not-prey separately. This can be done on a scale running from 
position, p > 0 (hunter - or prey) to p < 0 (not-hunter - or not-prey). 
See fig. 1. If we would represent both the prey and the hunter changes 
on one graph, we would have a bi-parametric catastrophe called "the 
Cusp". This type is shown in fig. 2 as applied in a classical analysis, 
by Zeeman, of the aggression of a dog." 
CT is, in other words, on the one hand a mathematization of the 
form which is generated. On the other hand, it is a method of repre-
senting qualitative changes graphically, and hence trying to open new 
possibilities for a theory of realistic meaning.12 
The actual change of the cat in our example is, in CT terms, an 
"inner" space to which the numeric scale provides an "outer" space of 
referential variables. One of Thorn's basic discoveries is that all 
possible changes in "inner" space can be described by seven strata of 
archetypal C-value in the "outer" space. These seven "archetypes" are 
called "elementary catastrophes"13, see fig. 3. 
As must be expected when introducing such an unorthodox and 
interdisciplinary theory, it evoked a lot of criticism. In order to be 
accepted within a traditional mathematical paradigm, the theory 
should be purely mathematical. It should prove its mathematical 
theorem on the basis of certain axioms, and that should be all. It 
should not, as CT in fact does, interfere with the world of phenomena. 
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In order to be accepted by physics, it should be testable by experi-
ments. Thorn's collaborator, Zeeman, claimed that CT could produce 
models by which it was possible to predict, with mathematical 
precision, the evolution of a morphogenesis, like the change of our 
cat. Zeeman thus attracted much criticism towards CT. Thom was, 
however, among the first to criticize Zeeman's claim.14 There are of 
course too many uncontrollable variables to be able to predict how 
much dog it would take to turn a hunter cat into a not-hunter cat; in 
other words to make the particular cat in question forget about the 
mouse and fly from the dog. 
This does not, however, mean that the graphic representation of 
the catastrophic change is not valid as a scheme, and the criticism on 
mathematical grounds does not indicate that the schemes are not 
mathematically correct or precise - as such. These objections are only 
reminders that the CT scheme, as any scheme or model, relates 
iconically to the particular case, not indexically as Zeeman would 
have it . 1 5 
The entire typology consists of seven types with a complexity of 
one to four dimensions. Fig. 3 shows the four that are of interest in the 
present connection. It has been held16 that the theorem of the seven 
catastrophes is a far too restricted basis for CT's claim of a general 
analysis of morphogenesis. Thorn17 responds to this objection by 
pointing out that the validity of CT does not depend on the seven 
elementary catastrophes. He holds, on the contrary, that it is necessary 
to exploit all the resources of the theory of bifurcations, which can be 
accomplished quite irrespectively of the general validity of that 
theorem. The basic principle of the mathematical schematization of 
a morphogenetic process organizing a structure with one or more 
catastrophic points, does not have to be erratic even if Thorn's typo-
logy of catastrophes was demonstrated to be so (which it to my know-
ledge has not been hitherto). The basic issue is, after all, the study of 
the nature of generic bifurcations, or in other words the identification 
of bifurcations that are structurally stable, which means that they 
happen more or less in the same way every time; as in for instance an 
embryo, a wave, a cat, or in our case - in architecture. 
I will spare my reader further details of this discussion18, and 
proceed to the introduction of the two kinds of elementary catastrophes 
that I will be applying, namely the 'Cusp', and the 'Butterfly'. 
i) The Cusp has three parameters and organizes two catastrophic 
points (C-points). Theclassical example of an applied Cusp is Zeeman's 
model of a dog's aggression. The graph, see fig. 2, which shows the 
actual pattern of behaviour of the dog, is called the "inner" space. The 
space of reference (L'espace de controle), the projection of the Cusp, 
corresponds to the "outer" space. The three dimensions, or para-
meters, are in this case fear, rage, and behaviour. The two C-points, or 
catastrophic changes, or bifurcations, are the attack and the escape. 
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C-points 
Figure 4a. The Butterfly at 
t > 0 according to René 
Thorn 1989. 
Figure 4b. The Butterfly at 
t < Oaccordingto René Thorn 
1989. Above it are shown 
the sections of the hypersur-
face as its ends, at the four 
C-points, and at the Butter-
flypoint. 
i i ) The Butterfly has six parameters and organizes four C-points. See 
fig. 4b. The Butterfly can be described as the transition of one Cuspoid 
kind of singularity via the "Butterfly-point" into another Cuspoid 
kind of singularity in the course of time. 1 9 Thom describes this 
transition with a three-dimensional hyper surface presupposing the 
fourth dimension, time, to be a constant.20 That is to say that in the 
spatio-temporal phenomenology of Thom, time, T, as a general para-
metre is considered as a constant. Let us say T= 1. The local time, t, 
of one particular phenomenon can, on the other hand, pass at a higher, 
lower, or equal velocity than the constant, T. We do in other words 
basically have three temporal conditions: t/T>0,t/T = 0 and t/T<0. 
Given that T= 1, these three conditions imply t > 0, t = 0 and t < 0 
respectively. These three t-values are henceforth used to represent the 
three temporal conditions. In order to illustrate the concept of t value, 
let us imagine our space-time continuum as a river with a boat on it. 
The water flows at a constant velocity. In order to escape associa-
tions to subject-object relations, let us refer to the boat as the topos of 
experience, the point where time and phenomena meet. A t t = 0 the 
boat moves at the same velocity as the water. Now; let us think of the 
movement of the water, as the flow of phenomena, and of the 
movement of the boat as local, or phenomenological, or experienced 
time, f. At t = 0 time and phenomena are in equi l ibr ium, all times 
meet all phenomena. We have a temporal simultaneity where every-
thing can virtually happen, but actually nothing happens. I t is hard to 
give a concrete example of this condition, because it is per definition 
a condition which only exists as a theoretical entity, like certain 
mathematical phenomena. We can imagine + 1 apple and -1 apple, but 
1/0 apple is phenomenologically impossible. 
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Global actuality. Time is one continuum, 
without singularities 
All is virtual. Time bifurcates in "past" and luture". The 
promise of knowledge is given. 
Figure 5. Scheme of the But-
terfly at t values t > o, t = 0 
and t < 0. Corresponding 
creodes as generated by the 
characteristic topologies 
involved are indicated in 
figures 6 and 7. 
At t > 0, however, the boat, that is the topos of experience, moves 
faster than the flow of phenomena. Then time and phenomena do not 
meet, nothing actually happens, phenomenologically speaking. Events 
do not take place, they remain a-topic. This is possible in as much as 
we can think, or imagine events faster than they actually happen - i f 
they do happen at all. We can imagine a unicorn, but we are not very 
likely to actually meet one, and travelling to the moon was imagined 
by Jules Verne long before the event actually took place. 
At t < 0 the topos of experience moves slower than the flow of 
events, which implies that time and phenomena actually do meet, that 
things actually do happen, that phenomenologically speaking events 
do take place. Compared to Jules Verne's speculations about how to 
get to the moon at t > 0, t < 0 would be the NASA Laboratory. A t t < 0 
we are inside "the empirical l imit", to borrow one of Eco's terms2 1, or 
"the event horizon" in Penrose and Hawking's words 2 2. 
Fig. 5 shows the Butterfly as the hyper surfaces in fig. 4 seen from 
above at the three t values. Fig. 4b shows the four bifurcations, or 
locations of the C-points, that emerge at t < 0. As w i l l be demonstrated 
below, the Butterfly is first and foremost of interest to architecture 
when t < 0. That is how I wi l l use it, and that is the condition of the 
Butterfly under which it generates the graph whose iconical quality 
gave name to this type of catastrophe. The graph is the projection of 
the cross section of the Butterfly at origo or at the Butterfly-point. 
t<0 
Local actuality. 'Present" emerges, and 
the promise of knowledge is met. 
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b 
The Hypersurface of the Butterfly 
at t > 0. The two typical trajectories 
through it are marked a and b. 
The creodes generated by the 
topologies of trajectory a, passing 
from one cuspoi'd to the other 
inside the hypersurface. 
The creodes generated by the 
topologies of trajectory b, passing 
through from one side os the "wave" 
to the other. 
Figure 6. 
The Passage at t > 0. 
B e t w e e n C o n c e p t i o n a n d M e m o r y 
The OpA interface can be described in semiotic terms, in ontological 
terms, or in terms of the pattern of activity that link the first two 
descriptions. 
The semiotic description would unfold within a scenario basically 
consisting of client, architect and user, and concern the process of 
conceptualization. I am referring to architect, client and user not as 
persons, but as roles or principles, as actants. 
The ontological description would unfold within a scenario 
basically consisting of fact, or the world as given to us, of misfit or 
problem, let us say in the form of rain and snow, and of competence 
- to satisfy the need for shelter; to regulate the misfit. This descrip-
tion would concern the process of attaining knowledge. 
The horizon of the semiotic perspective is hence conception, and 
memory is the horizon of the ontological perspective. These are both 
central perspectives in a design theory.23 In the following I w i l l , 
however, focus on the Butterfly as a way to describe topologically the 
pattern of activity which is at play between conception and memory. 
At t > 0 there are no singularities regulating the two positions, 
conception and memory, or the relationship between them. The 
topology of the relationship is shown in fig. 6. Here we see that there 
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The creodes generated by the characteristic 
topologies "Petitot-trajectory" through the 
Butterfly at t < 0. 
The Hypersurface of the Butterfly at t < 0. 
Typical sections showing first the cuspoids forming 
the polarities of the hypersurface, then the 
Swallow taiis.corresponding to C-points I and IV, 
and the section at the Butterflypoint in the middle. 
is no passage between position, or TOPOS 1 and TOPOS 2. The 
relationship between them would hence be subject to the same kind of 
weakness, or arbitrariness as the one that has always been menacing 
linguistics and linguistically based semiotics. 
A t t < 0, however, when time and phenomena do meet, such as in 
the NASA Laboratory, the succession of events occur as bifurcations 
in the hyper surface - which is now folding. Given FoA as general 
context, this folding corresponds to the events at play when a piece of 
FoA's space-time is actualized. See fig. 7. 2 4 For the sake of conven-
ience let us start from conception. 
The entire Butterfly is now inscribed in FoA. Before and after our 
model in fig. 7 there is in other words architecture in general; the 
general condition of FoA without consideration of misfit. Let us say 
that it corresponds to a condition of t > 0. We can now imagine that at 
the point where our butterfly-model starts is where the misfit enters 
and starts to exercise a pressure upon FoA. We can imagine that this 
pressure retards the movement of our boat causing the t value to drop 
below zero. Let us say that this is where conceptualization starts; when 
Figure 7. 
The Passage at t < 0. 
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the notion occurs that the architectural environment fails to perform 
as it is intended to do. This notion of course frequently occurs only to 
vanish again without leaving any trace in FoA. As our topic is design 
theory, I will however presuppose that the notion persists in troubling 
us, inducing the reflection that leads to the formulation of a problem 
and therefore to the first step towards solving it. This would be the 
phase of conception. In terms of the semiotic scenario this phase 
would imply that man, in the sense of the ultimate user of architecture, 
bifurcates into user and client. The architect has a special status. He 
is in a certain sense external to the scenario. We shall return to that. 
At the other end of our model we would have the phase of memory. 
In terms of the ontological scenario this phase would imply the bi-
furcation of the world in general into the three entities: fact, problem 
and competence. 
Now; we can imagine the condition of t < 0 exercising an external 
pressure upon the model which causes the two phases to fold into each 
other and form an interface between conception and memory. This 
interface is thus formed by the system of bifurcations hence created. 
Inscribed in a spatio-temporal phenomenology, which is what I am 
trying to do here, each bifurcation represents a singularity, an event, 
a spatio-temporal phenomenon. In these terms the butterfly is, at t< 0, 
a gestalt which is composed of a number of spatio-temporal phe-
nomena.25 
Let us have a look at one bifurcation at a time. According to a 
spatio-temporal order of succession the first bifurcations would be 
caused by the breaking of the top curve of the butterfly. This occurs 
when the opposition between "man" on one side, and the world-as-
given on the other causes the t value to fall below zero. 
The first thing to happen in the semiotic scenario is that man 
experiences resistance from the world. This experience induces two 
bifurcations, one in man and one in the world. Man bifurcates because 
"man" can not experience anything. Experience is individual, it pre-
supposes a particular topes, somewhere Man-in-general 
thus emanates one particular, experien. 
The corresponding bifurcation in the : : : . i. scenario is that 
the world-as-given bifurcates. The world-as-gwenisagenera] concept, 
but the world can not be experienced in general. Only particular parts, 
or points, or aspects of it are accessit :e The world 
hence emanates a particularity which is experienced by the experi-
encing man as a point of resistance, like for instance a pouring rain 
falling on the stony ground. 
These two bifurcations correspond to bifurcations II and III 
respectively, in fig. 4b. 
Man and world are now embodied in a human being finding 
himself in one particular place where he is exposed to a pouring rain. 
This situation generates another set of bifurcations. 
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In the semiotic scenario we have already seen man-in-general become 
one particular, experiencing man. Now experiencing-man bifurcates 
and becomes one perceiving experiencing-man and one acting 
experiencing-man. The first is a collective condition in as much as all 
members of a community experience. The second is an individual 
condition in as much as when a community acts, i t does so through a 
representant acting on behalf of the collective. The first is the user, and 
the second is the one who takes on, or is given the task of doing 
something about the rain. This is the role which in an architectural 
context is referred to as the client. 
In the ontological scenario the point of experience bifurcates in a 
problem, which is that of getting wet and cold, and potential solution, 
which is that of building a shelter from the stones on the ground. The 
rain can be called a threatening fact, and the stone a helping fact.2 6 
The OpA interface is hence composed of-, and regulated by these 
four singularities (threatening fact, helping fact, client and user). 
According to a spatio-temporal order of succession they appear in 
couples, first the problem and the user, I and IV in fig. 4b, then the 
helping fact and the client, I I and I I I in fig. 4b. 
According to a historical order of succession, which would be the 
order in which the OpA interface is actualized as architecture, the 
singularities, or in this context rather the events, would appear 
successively from I to IV. Two more elements are however required 
in order for the actualization to be realized. Now we are coming to the 
architect, and to ObA. 
In narratological terms the architect would be the hero which is 
appointed to act on behalf of the community. The community is in our 
scenario composed of client and user. The client is appointed to 
represent and to act on behalf of the user(s), like the mayor of a village. 
Because the client has a general representative role to maintain, he is 
bound to respect the social contract and his position within the 
community. In order to go on a special mission, like killing a drake or 
"neutralize" a mad scientist behind enemy lines, one needs a special 
agent who can move and act unrestricted by social regulations; one 
who is "licensed to k i l l " . St. George was such an agent, and James 
Bond another one. The equivalent to social regulations in our context 
are the positions who compose the pluri-actantial gestalt27. In our 
context the architect is therefore the special agent who is licensed, not 
to k i l l , but to move freely between the positions, and ObA would 
correspond to the heart of the drake or the dossiers of the mad scientist. 
The architect hence serves as the agent who, in terms of the OpA 
interface, bring the singularities of the two scenarios together, media-
tes between them, and actualizes or makes the mediation manifest. 
ObA is the actual object which represents and makes the OpA interface 
manifest, and by whose presence the misfit is regulated. OpA is the 
turning-point of the OpA interface, its very point of actualization. 
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Figure 8. Part of an "epige-
netic landscape", illustrating 
Waddington's concept of 
chreodes as canalized path-
ways of change. (From Shel-
drake 1988, p. 100.) 
Figure 9. Neural network in 
the human brain. (From Bru-
nak & Lautrup 1989, p. 31.) 
S o m e C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s 
We can read the topologies showing the succession of bifurcations as 
local sections of that part of FoA in which we are active at the moment. 
E. g. FoA understood as a morphic field28, formed as an epigenetic 
landscape. 
The typical topology of the Cusp, see fig. 3, have two minima, 
positions, or attractors. The typical topology of the butterfly has three, 
of which, in our case, one corresponds to thought, one to thing, and 
one to OpA. This makes it possible, in the case of the butterfly, to 
follow one minimum emerging for instance in thought, and then 
wandering through and establishing ObA on its way towards and into 
thing. The shape of these movements is shown as 'creodes' in fig. 6 
and 7. See also fig. 8. 
The correspondingly constructed system of creodes at t > 0 
demonstrates a structure where the passage between thought and 
thing is possible only as a random leap from the one to the other across 
the threshold between them, or on eradicating one of the two. In its 
logical consequence this means that in either case there is no ternary 
system of minima, in both cases we would have to do with an arbitrary 
relationship between thought and thing. 
The pragmatic conjunction of architecture's material aspects and 
its cognitive ones by the silent and immediate act of a genius would, 
I believe, be epistemologically equivalent to the system of creodes at 
t > 0. In terms of the OpA interface such a design methodology, would 
correspond to a halt at the first bifurcation. It would leave the interface 
with man and world as the only singularities, without differentiating 
either of the two further. Neither semiotic nor ontological scenario 
would unfold, and we would be left with a rather simple point of 
existential confrontation between man and world in which only the 
stronger wi l l survive. 
I could think of quite a few architects who would advocate this as 
the only way to create "true architecture". It would undoubtfully be 
a true confrontation, but there are good reasons to discuss whether the 
result would be architecture or not, strictly speaking. 
At t < 0 the succession of topologies, however, generate an 
elementary system of passages in FoA - possibly comparable to 
creodes in an epigenetic landscape, fig. 8, or synapses in a neural 
network, fig. 9. A difference between the architecture of biology or 
intelligence, however, and the architecture of FoA, would be the way 
in which we, as "products" of an epigenetic landscape, or as "infe-
rences" of a neural network, intentionally can influence our own 
morphogenesis. 
OpA is that condition under which the interface emerges, ObA is 
the material foundation of the interface and the architect is the agent 
who/which actualizes it. See fig. 10. This suggests a rather basic 
epistemological role for architecture. 
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If these speculations on buildings and butterflies do make sense, they Figure 10. The OpA Interface 
might indicate two directions of further development of design 
theory. By virtue of their methodological approach, mathematizations 
of the OpA interface, the present reflections would prepare for a 
further integration between design theory and studies of CAD and 
artificial intelligence. By virtue of their epistemological implications, 
these reflections would approach the issue of an architectonic theory 
of knowledge. 
1. 
2. 
References 
The reference to The Force Dynamic Theory of Leonard Talmy 
is deliberately kept implicit as an elaboration of this point would 
exceed the scope of the present text. It is, however elaborated in 
M0ystad 1993a, p. 137 and p. 210 ff. See also Talmy 1985. 
These two "modes of being" of architecture are referred to as 
architecture's first and second mode of being. Together with 
architecture's third mode of being they are elaborated in op. cit. 
M0ystad, section C.l.1.3 "The Field of Architecture", p. 141ff. 
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3. Pérez-Gômez 1992, p. xvi. 
4. Use is here meant in the broadest sense of the word, spanning 
from the most pragmatic and functional levels to the most 
reflective and aesthetical ones. 
5. The initiatives of Prince Charle s as well as that of the Norwegian 
Ministry of Culture would be among the examples of such 
requirements. More concretely, however, are contract formulas 
containing such conditions actually being used, to my knowledge, 
in England and France. There is little reason to believe that these 
are the only EG countries following such a practice. 
6. A more elaborate definition of "Object" in this context, ObA, is 
a topic apart. 
7. Cf. previous note. 
8. In an interview with NRC Handelsblad (Holland) 11.02.93: "Het 
(de catastrofetheorie) is een manier van wiskundig modelleren 
van verschijnselen waar continue oorzaken aanleiding geven tot 
discontinue effecten." 
9. Thom 1983, p. 59: "je dirais plutôt qu'il s'agit d'une méthodo-
logie". 
10. Thom 1989. 
11. Here borrowed from Thom 1983, p. 78-79. 
12. Cf. Brandt's suggestion of a stable passage between content and 
expression, and the 'new rational paradigm' in "Brev om by og 
betydning", M0ystad 1992c. 
13. Thom 1989, p. 60 ff. 
14. Thorn's latest book, which is a very comprehensible introduction 
to - and discussion of - CT, is alluding to this by its title: Prédire 
n'est pas expliquer (To Predict is not to Explain), Thom 1991. 
15. The iconicity of schemes, the relation between general scheme 
and particular event, is further elaborated in M0ystad 1993a p. 
172 ff and p.213ff. 
16. Cf. the objections of Sussmann and Zahler discussed in Thom 
1983, p. 73.ff. 
17. Ibid. p. 74. 
18. If my reader is interested in subjecting CT to closer scrutiny I 
recommend that she reads Paraboles et Catastrophes (Thom 
1983) which is a comprehensive introduction to and discussion of 
CT, and Apologie du logos (Thom 1990) which is Thorn's 
collected essays from 1980-1990. Recently there has been pub-
lished another comprehensive introduction to the discussions 
around CT in the form of an interview with Thom; Prédire n'est 
pas expliquer, Paris 1992. For those who read Danish, Morfologi 
og tekstvidenskab (F. Stjernfeldt 1992) will probably be useful. 
19. At this point I should mention that between each cuspoid singularity 
and the Buttefly-point there does appear a third kind of singulari-
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ty, the Swallow's Tail. I will however not persue this in any depth 
here. 
20. Thorn 1989, p. 68 ff. 
21 . Hawking 1988, p. 88 
22. E c o l 9 7 1 , p . 267. 
23. They are both elaborated in M0ystad 1993a, Part C. 
24. There are of course an infinite number of possible trajectories 
through the butterfly. The butterfly is, however, the only cata-
strophe which provides the possibility of this particular one 
which generates the topology shown in fig. 7. 
For a further discussion of the choice of this trajectory and its 
epistemological implications, see Petitot 1983 and Stjernfeldt 
1986. For arguments as to the particular relevance of this trajec-
tory to architecture, see op.cit. M0ystad, p. 202-208. 
25. Jean Petitot refers to it as a "Pluri-Actantial Gestalt". See op. cit. 
Petitot, op. cit. Stjernfeldt and op. cit. M0ystad. 
26. Cf. the monster and the magical helper in Brandt 1991c, p. 78, and 
in M0ystad 1993a, p. 193 ff. 
27. See note 22. 
28. I am using the term "morphic field" after Rupert Sheldrake, as 
different from "morphogenetic field" with respect to the two-way 
influence between field and organism in the former case. Shel-
drake 1988, p. 111. 
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